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Abstract
We study worker turnover in a transition economy to investigate to what extent the length of time a
worker has been employed by a firm shapes the turnover process.  Using data from the Polish Labour
Force Survey and The Russian Longitudinal Monitor Survey we compare the pattern of turnover with a
Western economy, Britain.  We show tenure profiles are higher and flatter in Russia and steeper and
lower in Poland than in Britain.  The characteristics of workers hired in the state and private sectors do
not look very different.  State and private sector firms in Poland offer the same wages to new recruits,
but new private sector jobs in Russia appear to offer wage premia relative to new state jobs.  We argue
that these observations are consistent with a framework where the value of seniority in jobs begun
under the old order may be small and the value of a continued job match unsure, offset, in Poland at
least, by insider resistance to layoffs.
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1. Introduction
“a sample of the confused events in those feverish days, when everyone knew that
something was going to happen, but nobody knew just what”
John Reed – Ten Days that Shook the World (1932)
Economic transition in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has led to both re-allocation of
labour across industries and occupations and re-structuring of tasks within continuing organisations. 
Re-allocation involves the transfer of labour and other resources from sectors in decline, primarily state
owned, to expanding, mainly privately owned, sectors.  Re-structuring, on the other hand, occurs within
state or privatised firms seeking to adapt and survive in the new economic environment.  This requires a
more efficient use of labour resources in an attempt to raise productivity.  Restructuring will make some
working processes obsolete and expose workers to a greater risk of job loss.  Labour shedding is then
viewed as one consequence of this process.  At the same time, any upturn in the rate of new job
creation can facilitate job quitting and even within-firm transfers of workers.  In what follows, we
analyse which workers are affected by the transition process, concentrating on the effect of job tenure
on worker separations and on the factors affecting new job accessions. 
In one strand of the Western literature (e.g. Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981, and Farber, 1999),
the length of job tenure is associated with the intensity of firm-specific capital, which can generate an
inverse but convex relationship between job separations, whether worker or firm initiated, and tenure. 
To what extent tenure helps determine the separation process in an economy undergoing transition,
where firm-specific capital for many workers may no longer retain its value, is the first subject of this
paper.  We argue that if firm-specific capital has depreciated dramatically, then separations, quits and
layoffs, may occur higher up the tenure distribution than in a Western economy.
However, there are other factors that may be important in explaining worker turnover in
transition economies.  Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and Blanchard (1997) argue that high
unemployment will provoke resistance to restructuring through labour shedding in state firms or firms
privatised internally.  So insider power may act to moderate the rate of separations at any tenure, but
also, because job tenure may be correlated with insider power, this would concentrate separations at
the lower end of the tenure distribution.  This could then generate a steeper tenure-turnover profile than
in an economy not subject to mass insider privatisation or lacking strong union influence.
The second aspect of worker turnover that we examine is the hiring process.  Analysing the
short end of the tenure distribution gives us information about the extent of new hires and, with
knowledge of firm ownership, a means of comparing labour requirements in both re-allocation and
restructuring.  A simple view would be that private sector hiring will be the result of labour re-allocation
and new job creation, whilst the state sector will be engaged primarily in re-structuring and therefore
replacement hiring.
This paper analyses the patterns of worker turnover in two transition countries, Poland and
Russia, and compares these patterns to those of a benchmark Western economy, Britain, located
toward the flexible end of the labour market.  The two transition economies differ both in their reform
stance and in their labour market experiences.  In Poland, open unemployment emerged rapidly after a
consistent reform programme was implemented in 1990.  In Russia, transition began later and has been
more sporadic, but without the emergence of mass unemployment.  Here, labour adjustment has
occurred instead mainly on
2the price side, with a sharp fall in real wages and the build up of large wage arrears affecting more than
half of those in work, (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999).  The pace of privatisation has been
slower in Poland than in Russia, which may have consequences for worker turnover through some
insider mechanism.  In Russia, failure to index unemployment benefits to inflation and often the failure by
the authorities to pay benefits make job reallocation through unemployment more unlikely than in
Poland.
There were also differences in how the labour market operated under central planning in the
two countries that might have a bearing on the adjustment process during transition.1  A large legal
private non-agricultural sector in Poland in the eighties competed with the state sector for labour
resources.  This competition ensured that there was virtually no slack in the state sector, a tendency
reinforced by substantial labour hoarding in order to meet production targets and enterprise level
bonuses, (Góra and Rutkowski, 1990).  In contrast, the Soviet labour market, without a legal private
sector since the early thirties, had considerable slack throughout its history.  This slack manifested itself
in regular open unemployment in certain regions (Malle, 1986) despite a public commitment to full
employment and lack of unemployment benefits.  Overmanning and a low utilisation rate of labour
resources was also widespread, (Porkett, 1989).  In Soviet times, the employment of many Russian
workers may therefore have been more tenuous than that of their Polish colleagues.
Porkett (1989) argues that the excess demand system and concentration on labour intensive
methods of production meant that many workers in the Soviet Union were found in jobs unsuited to
their qualifications, despite an assignment system that placed many graduates and specialised workers in
jobs for three years.  Faced with a system where unskilled labour was often in demand more highly than
academic qualifications, many graduates and technicians left their allotted workplaces and moved to
enterprises in search of manual workers.  Fringe benefits, such as the provision of housing, or
kindergartens, were important factors in the competition for workers.  Thus, not only the
underutilisation of labour through over-manning but also the "wrong" utilisation of labour was
widespread in the Soviet Union.  In Poland, these features were less prevalent in the eighties, because
labour market conditions were tighter.
Whilst the excess demand regimes are now gone, the old hiring and turnover patterns may
persist in the early phases of transition.  For example, Commander, McHale and Yemtsov (1995) have
argued that fixed coefficients technology may ensure that certain groups of workers required in
communist times continue to be in demand in an environment where investment in new technology is
sluggish.  If so, then this would distort western notions of allocating workers through rewarding
recognised qualifications, instead enhancing the value of experience within a firm.  Moreover this type of
production process would require a given share of unskilled workers which may lead to hiring rates for
certain workers above those expected in a state sector subject to a large negative shock.
In general, the more widespread, the more consistent and the longer the reform process and the
shorter the experience under central planning, the less we would expect the legacy of former times to
endure.  Poland and Russia are at different stages of the "transition cycle".  By the autumn of 1994, the
Polish economy had been growing for 3 years, whilst the Russian economy was mired in transition
induced recession and has continued to be so.  This different position of the two economies in the
transition cycle and differences in the nature of reform allow us to contrast worker turnover.
Using data from the Polish Labour Force Survey, (PLFS), and The Russian Longitudinal
                                                
1. Malle (1986), Granick (1987) and Porkett (1989) all discuss labour turnover in the Soviet Union.  Freeman
(1987), Simatupang (1994), Lehmann and Schaffer (1995) do likewise for Poland.
3Monitor Survey, (RLMS), we match individuals across waves 12 months apart in order to measure the
incidence of worker mobility in the years 1994 to 1995.  We compare the pattern of turnover with data
from Britain for the period 1996-1997, when the economy was three years into a recovery.  We then
look in detail at new jobs, those held by a worker for less than 12 months, in an attempt to identify the
principal sectors in which job growth is occurring, the main characteristics of the individuals who fill
them and whether there are notable cross-country differences in the pattern of new hires.  We split the
data into state and private ownership in order to examine, for example, whether workers are leaving the
state sector in order to obtain jobs in the private sector, whether less skilled workers are obliged to
seek new jobs in the state sector, whether new private sector jobs are more unstable, whether there is
any evidence that wage differentials are guiding re-allocation.
Section 2 sets out a simple model of worker turnover that may be relevant to a transition
economy.  We argue that the returns to seniority in jobs begun under the old order may be small and
the value of a continued job match lower than in new sectors.  As a result, both voluntary and
involuntary turnover can occur at higher levels of the job tenure distribution than may be expected in the
West.  Insider resistance to restructuring could, however, dampen worker turnover.  Section 3 outlines
the data sources used in the study, whilst Section 4 looks at separation rates across countries and finds
evidence of higher turnover at all tenures in Russia than in either Poland or Britain.  Section 5 examines
the pattern of new hires.  Section 6 concludes to the effect that the patterns of worker turnover that we
observe in Russia are consistent with the human capital destruction model, but that insider power may
have prevented the same pattern from emerging in Poland.
2. Theoretical Considerations
How might worker turnover and job tenure be modelled in a transition economy? A simple, two-period
model will suffice to illustrate our main points.  Suppose that there are two job types, one in the old
sector and one in the new sector, distinguished by their overall productive potential, f, and that fo < fn
where fn is normalised to one.  The old jobs will be primarily in state or privatised firms which have not
yet re-structured and the new jobs will be found in the emerging private and transforming state and
privatised sectors.  Equally, this dichotomy could be applied to a comparison of a transition and a
Western economy.  Let the value of a job match, y, rise with firm specific human capital or seniority
according to, yi(t), where i = old, (o) or new, (n).  This allows the relationship between tenure and
productivity to differ in the two sectors.  Hence the wage paid to the worker in either sector is given by
Wi = Wa + li yi(t)fi                 i = o, n  (1)
where Wa is the fall-back wage common to both sectors and l is the worker's share of the
4value of the job match. 2  Suppose voluntary job quits occur as the result of a simple comparison of the
wage at tenure t and the wage in a new job with tenure zero.  It follows that a worker will quit an old
sector job for the new sector if
lo yo(t)fo < ln yn(0)                                       (2)
The existence of a productivity differential will ensure that job quits from old to new could occur at any
tenure, but that the quit rate will decline with tenure as rewards to seniority grow.  The smaller fo relative
to fn or the smaller the growth rate of firm-specific capital in the old sector, y'o(t), then the more likely
w(t)o < w(0)n for some t that is greater than would occur in an economy not subject to transition.  Quits
from the old to the new sector happen further up the tenure distribution than in a Western economy. 
The greater the share of the old sector, the larger the aggregate quit rate at any tenure.3
A firm will lay workers off if the wage exceeds the total value of the job match,
V =  Wa + y(t).  The profit of firm i is
Pi = Vi - Wi = (1-li )yi(t)fi (3)
Following a random negative shock to the value of the worker's output, f, that may, for example, be
industry-specific, the profit of a firm falls by f and hence the firm will lay workers off if profits become
negative, that is if
|f| >  (1-li )yi(t)fi , (4)
i.e. if the shock is sufficiently greater than the firm's share of the value of the match.  It follows that given
the same shock there will be more layoffs in the old sector compared to the new sector and that layoffs
will also occur further up the tenure distribution in the old sector, since
(1-lo )yo(t)fo <  (1-ln )y n(t) (5)
A higher, flatter tenure-turnover profile is therefore consistent with the emergence of differential
productivity-tenure relations in the old and new sectors that affect both quit and layoff behaviour.
This is, of course, not the only model that may explain tenure-turnover profiles.  Aghion and
Blanchard's (1994) and Blanchard's (1997) models of restructuring, whilst saying little about tenure
explicitly, could be used to invoke a story of insider resistance to restructuring, which would also
generate an inverse tenure-turnover profile.  According to this model, there may be more insider
resistance in Poland than in Russia because unemployment is higher in the former than in the latter and
because trade union influence is more prevalent in Poland in state and privatised firms, which still
account for the bulk of employment.4
We can introduce insider effects into our theoretical framework by allowing the worker's share
of the job match to rise with seniority in the old sector.  In this case (2) becomes
                                                
2. Farber (1999) uses a one-sector version of this set-up while Pissarides (1994) uses a two-sector approach in
his analysis of the failure of unemployment to fall in Western economies despite economic recovery.
3. Within sector quits occur if positive random shocks to the outside wage exceed the value of the
worker's share of the job match. This follows from (1).
4. Jackman (1995) suggests that wage bargaining is not prevalent in the new private sector.
5l(t)o yo(t)fo < ln yn(0)                                    (6)
and job quits in the old sector become more concentrated at lower tenures.  Hence the aggregate
tenure turnover profile lies to the left of that of an economy not subject to insider resistance.  More
insider power implies, of course, that firms find it harder to layoff workers with higher tenure, even
though insider power will reduce the firm's share of the match value, (1-l(t)o )yo(t)fo further and so
encourage layoffs higher up the tenure distribution following a negative shock.
There may also be features unique to a transition economy that help explain the dynamics of
worker turnover.  There is, for example, an implicit assumption above that firms face a hard budget
constraint.  Whilst this may be true in Poland, the evidence for Russia shows that certain sectors of the
economy enjoyed soft budget constraints in our sample period.  Polish state firms had to impose hiring
freezes because of the hardening of the budget constraint (Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer, 1996),
whilst in Russia we observe relatively large hirings by state firms that might be related to the endurance
of soft budget constraints. 
It is also possible to envisage a re-working of the experience good theory of turnover of
Jovanovic (1979).  If new information about the quality of the match arrives, generated by the transition
process, then a separation could occur at any tenure.  There may also be elements of experience good
job shopping in the new jobs emerging from the transition process.  This learning process may take
longer because of unfamiliarity with the new labour market environment and rules.  Running counter to
these influences, separations may be caused by the intrinsic weakness of the emerging private sector,
especially in the early phase of transition.  Greater uncertainty and lack of infrastructure may destroy
many new job matches soon after their inception. 5  Moreover a fixed coefficient technology may
require old, unrestructured firms to hire labour relevant to the old means of production.
In truth, the observed tenure-turnover profile will contain elements of all these factors.  We
therefore proceed to examine whether there is any evidence that worker turnover patterns are
consistent with the arguments set out here.
3. Data
For Russia, we use the second phase of the RLMS, a longitudinal panel of around 4000 households
across the Russian federation conducted in the autumn of 1994, 1995 and 1996.  The data contains a
set of demographic and establishment characteristics, together with information on the labour market
activities of its sample.  Despite its relatively small size, the advantage of this source for our purposes is
that we can track individuals and the incidence of worker turnover over time.  We treat each wave as a
separate cross section and restrict the matched sample to those present for two consecutive waves.
The data for Poland are drawn from 3 waves of the PLFS, a quarterly survey of around
30,000 households begun in May 1992.  Job tenure information was included from May 1994.  The
data have a panel element.  There is an approximate 50% overlap between surveys one year apart.  To
eliminate seasonal effects in our cross-country comparisons we use the autumn waves for the years
1994, 1995 and 1996.  This does not, of course, eliminate the differences between the two countries in
                                                
5. Acquisti and Lehmann (1998) show that job destruction rates are highest in new private sector Russian
firms.
6the extent and nature of reform.
To provide comparable estimates for a western country we construct a similar data set for
Britain, matching workers over the Autumn 1996 and 1997 Labour Force Surveys, a period when
Britain was three years into an economic recovery.  All the samples cover anyone who classifies
themselves as being in work and is not restricted to the population of working age, since, because of
the transition process but also for historic reasons, we observe many individuals above statutory
pensionable age in work.  This gives us a total matched sample of around 7000 for Russia, 12000 for
Poland and 27000 for Britain.
Job tenure information in all surveys is given in the form of the number of months and years that
the worker has been continuously employed in the same establishment.  For the Russian and British
data, only the year in which the job started is recorded if the job began more than 8 years prior to the
interview.  We follow the recommendations of Brown and Light (1992) and ensure internal consistency
across waves for the job tenure measures for the same individual for all job tenures 12 months and
above.  This, the authors argue, will tend to reduce the biases associated with measurement error of job
tenure.
We identify a new job as one held by a worker who has been with the same employer for less
than 12 months.  Farber (1997) notes that this may mean that we over-sample more mobile workers
and possibly low quality jobs if low quality jobs break up faster, though in a transition economy, this
process of break up is exactly what we hope to measure.  Nor do we identify net new jobs.  Our
definition encompasses hires made as a result of enterprise re-location, worker replacements as well as
the creation of genuine new vacancies.  However, this aggregate process is exactly the event we wish to
examine.
Since there is no information on worker history between interviews, our mobility measures are
based on observations 12 months apart.  Having only 2 observation points makes it difficult for us to
control for any unobserved worker/firm heterogeneity that may affect our results.  The 12 month limit
also does not allow us to distinguish between jobs that will eventually become good matches and those,
which will end soon after.  A job-to-job move is defined as one in which the worker was employed and
at both observation points, but had job tenure less than 12 months when interviewed for the second
time.  Job separations are the sum of these job-to-job moves and moves from employment to non-
employment between the two observation points.  Neither measure captures whether the move was
voluntary or otherwise, though anecdotal evidence from Russia suggests that firms may try to disguise
layoffs in an attempt to avoid redundancy payments.  Nor can we apply continuous time methods of
estimation to information gathered in this way.  Some studies, (for example Grogan and van den Berg,
1999; Adamchik and King, 1999), have attempted to create continuous time data by using
retrospective information on time in the current state matched to information on labour market status
one year earlier.  This approach however leaves open the possibility of missing any transitions between
the state occupied 12 months earlier and the start of the current spell, so we do not pursue this course
here.  We are only able to match individuals between 1994 and 1995 of the PLFS because of the lack
of individual identifiers in subsequent waves. 
Respondents in the RLMS are asked to state the amount of money received from their
employers after tax in the past month together with hours worked.  There is no distinction made
between basic wages and any bonus.  These wages are then deflated by a national price deflator
indexed to 100 at January 19966.  The PLFS elicits net monthly wage and information for full-time
                                                
6. Source: Russian Economic Trends.
7employees only.  The British data are gross monthly wages.  All are converted to weekly wages and
indexed to January 1996 values for the respective countries.
The results for Russia will be affected by the presence of wage arrears.  Lehmann, Wadsworth
and Acquisti, (1999) show that between 40 and 60% of the workforce are affected by arrears.  We
choose not to remove those in arrears from the estimation but include instead a dummy variable for the
presence of wage arrears in the Russian regressions.  The existence of short-time working will also
introduce additional measurement error into hourly wage estimates.  For these reasons we do not
deflate wages by hours in what follows.
Our definition of the private sector includes the self-employed and those in privatised firms
together with those in new private firms, in the absence of any identifying information in the data sets. 
The wage data do, however, exclude the self-employed.
4. Separations
Table 1 displays the job tenure distribution in the three countries in 1994 and 1996.  Around 14% of
the Polish workforce are in new jobs, with tenure under one year, and about 19% of the Russian
workforce.  The latter is similar to both the British fraction and Farber's (1997) estimates for the United
States.  So, on this simple measure, the pace of re-allocation is not much faster in the transition
economies.  The Polish distribution has a large concentration of workers with tenure in excess of 20
years.  Some of this is explained by the presence of private sector farming and the large share of
agriculture in the Polish economy, (25%).  When we remove agriculture, the fraction of these long-term
jobs falls to 16%.  Of these, 85% are in the state sector, against a state share of 65% in total
employment.  The Russian distribution does not look radically different from Western tenure profiles. 
Unlike in Britain, however, the rate of new hires is lower for women than men.  The state sector (not
shown) again accounts for a larger share of jobs with tenure in excess of 20 years, 63% against a total
state employment share of 56%.  The age distributions of the working populations in Poland and Russia
are similar and are, therefore, unlikely to explain much of the difference in the tenure stocks.7
We now turn to job separations in order to examine the correlation between mobility and job
tenure.  Table 2 and Figure 1 outline the worker separation rate conditional on job tenure.  After the
first year, the tenure-turnover profile for Russia is higher and flatter than that for Britain.  For Poland,
however, there is evidence of a steeper, tenure-mobility profile than in either Russia or Britain, during
the first 5 years on the job and a lower profile thereafter8.  Most of these higher tenure workers will be
employed in privatised or state firms. This could indicate that insider forces help shape the turnover
process in Poland more than in
Russia.9     
For Russia, this profile tails off after around ten years and remains at a much higher level
                                                
7. The British age distribution has slightly fatter tails. The respective proportions of employed workers in
Russia, Poland and Britain aged under 30 are  0.228, 0.219 and 0.26, while the proportions of those 50
and over are 0.177, 0.168 and 0.222. The effects of the fatter tails for the tenure distribution in Britain will
tend to offset each other.
8. Unlike the tenure distribution, the Polish turnover data are not affected by the inclusion of agriculture.
9. Again, removal of the Polish agricultural sector does not much change the separation rates by age for
those in the 5 year’s tenure and over groups.
8throughout.  In every country, more than one third of all new jobs end within two years, (row 1).  In
Russia, one fifth of jobs that have lasted between two and five years will break up within the following
year.  Around one in six jobs in Poland or Britain will do so.  Even after ten years, one in six Russian
jobs break up, twice the Polish rate and 75% higher than in Britain.  Note the job-to-job profiles for
Poland and Russia lie generally below that of Britain.  So the higher aggregate profile for Russia is
driven by moves into non-employment.
The differences in the tenure profiles are reflected in the age-turnover profiles in the bottom
panel of Table 210.  Turnover amongst Russian workers is much higher than in Britain at all levels of the
age distribution beyond age 19.  One quarter of Russian 30-34 year olds will separate from their jobs
within a year, compared with one in 5 British and one in 6 Polish workers.  Job-to-job moves continue
at a near uniform rate in Russia between the ages of twenty-five and fifty, while the age-turnover profile
for Poland falls with age and, as such, is similar to that of Britain11.
Table 3 confirms that whilst mobility declines as experience and tenure grow, there remains a
large degree of turnover in new jobs at all ages, (column 1) This is not however, confined to the
transition economies.  Turnover in new jobs held by British workers is also high at all age levels. 
Mobility appears to fall with age at given tenures, in particular job-to-job moves.  These results are
somewhat at odds with Mincer and Jovanovic's (1981) earlier findings for the U.S. that mobility does
not decline at given tenure intervals across age groups.
State v. private
We now examine differences in turnover patterns across the state and private sectors.12 Table 4 and
Figure 2 give the tenure-turnover profiles in the two sectors, together with the destination state of those
who separate from their jobs.  Separation rates in the state sector are higher in Russia than in Poland. 
Moreover the decline of turnover with tenure in Poland is much faster in the state sector than in Russia.
 This is consistent with the productivity differential and insider stories outlined in Section 2.  Separation
rates from the private sector are, however, higher at all tenures under twenty years than in the state
sector in all three countries.  Whether the source of this differential lies with the behaviour of the
privatised or new private sectors cannot be elicited from the data.  Private sector separation rates are
highest in Russia.  Given the dominance of the state sector in overall employment in the transition
economies, this means that aggregate turnover in Russia is high, primarily because turnover in the state
sector is relatively higher.  Aggregate turnover in Poland is relatively low because the private sector in
Poland accounts for a lower share of the workforce than in Britain.
Table A1 in the appendix shows 50% of all separations in the Polish private sector and 40% in
Russia are from jobs that have lasted less than one year.  This is consistent with a higher incidence of
job shopping and experience good sampling in the private sector.  Evidence also, perhaps, that the re-
allocation process was more advanced in Poland is that there are more state-to-state moves in Russia. 
However the overall incidence of state-to- private sector moves is the same in both countries13.
                                                
10. Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) show that the observed age turnover profile ds/dX = (ds/dT*dT/dX) +
ds/dX where s is separations, T is tenure and X is experience. Convexity in the tenure profile, dT/dX,
reinforces convexity in the age-turnover profile.
11. The Polish turnover results are changed little by the removal of agriculture.
12.  Ownership is self-assessed in every case.
13. Table A2 in the appendix documents the shares of new hires from employment and non-employment.
9Table 5 attempts to establish whether these findings hold controlling for other factors.  We
present simple binary probit estimates of the probability that a worker will separate from a job within a
year.  The set of explanatory variables control for differences in gender, education, region, firm size and
industry, together with age and job tenure.  We present marginal effects alongside their standard errors,
where the marginal effects give percentage point deviations scaled relative to the default tenure
category, (ten years and over), with all other variables set to their sample means.  The reference
probabilities are given at the foot of the Table.  The first column for each country reports the tenure
profile in the absence of regression controls.  The other columns include controls.  The results from the
cross tabulations are not overturned.  Turnover declines with tenure, but, after the first year,  the Polish
and British profiles generally lie below the Russian one.  When the data are split into the state and
private sectors, (Table 6), the tenure-turnover profiles observed in Table 4 remain robust to the
inclusion of controls.  Turnover in the Russian state sector is higher than turnover in the Polish state
sector at all tenures greater than one year.
Tables A3-A5 in the appendix, present marginal effects from multinomial logit estimates of the
likelihood that a worker in employment will stay in the same job, move between jobs or move into non-
employment over the 12 month observation interval, in order to see whether tenure effects differ
according to the destination state.  In Poland (and Britain), the job-to-job turnover effects are smaller
than the tenure profiles determining moves into non-employment.  In Russia, the opposite pattern is
observed.  In all countries, moves into non-employment are more likely to be experienced by the under
25s and those approaching retirement age14.  The age effects on mobility are also larger for Russia.
5. New Jobs
We now examine the pattern of new job creation in the transition economies, focusing on the
characteristics of the workers hired and the relative pay in these new jobs, as a proxy for their quality. 
Table 7 undertakes a simple steady state exercise to establish the likely number of new jobs a worker
can expect to hold over the working lifetime, if current worker turnover patterns were to persist. 
Following Hall (1982), we calculate the flow of new job matches across age categories and use this to
estimate the number of new jobs held in each age group.  In a steady state, the annual number of new
jobs is twice the fraction with job tenure of 6 months or less.  The number of jobs held over a five year
period is then five times this annual rate and the expected number of lifetime jobs is the sum over the
entire working age range.  Using 1996 as the base, the average Polish worker could expect to hold
around 12 jobs over the life cycle and the average Russian worker 13 jobs, if current conditions persist.
 Two thirds of these jobs are held before the age of 30 and reflect the large degree of turnover
observed amongst younger workers.  This also explains the higher number of total number of jobs for
both countries compared to Britain.
Table 8 outlines the pattern of survival of new job matches over time.  Following job tenure
cohorts across subsequent waves of data we can estimate quarterly retention rates for Britain and
Poland and annual rates for Russia for all workers in jobs with tenure under 12 months in November
1994.  We also identify state and private sector jobs separately since the national totals are influenced
by the national shares of each sector.  Table 8 indicates that new job matches in Poland break up faster
                                                
14. Fifty-five for women and sixty for men, though certain occupations provide for retirement at earlier
ages.
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than in Britain and Russia, particularly within the first year.  This is consistent with the steeper Polish
tenure-turnover profiles in Table 2.  Around one half of all new jobs in Poland end within one year and
40% of new Russian jobs.  A further 10% of the new job stock disappears within another year in both
countries.  Job survival rates are higher in the state sector.  Around 44% of Polish state sector jobs
survive for at least two years and only 30% of private sector jobs.  In Russia, the respective two-year
survival rates are 56% and 39%.
Table 9 presents marginal effects from probit estimates of the likelihood that a worker is
observed in a new job.  We present separate estimates for the state and private sector, which may give
us an insight into potential differences in the hiring requirements of the re-allocation and restructuring
processes.  The coefficients are marginal effects and are calculated as percentage point deviations from
the sample mean proportions of workers with tenure less than 12 months.  The means differ across
sectors and countries, so some caution must be exercised when comparing these marginal effects.  The
results suggest that younger workers dominate the stock of new hires in both sectors.  However,
beyond age 25 the new hire rate is relatively flat, around 10 to 17 percentage points below that of the
default youth category.  Whilst the likelihood ratio tests accept the state-private sample split in all three
countries, the marginal effects, if the respective sample means are taken into account, imply little
difference in the age share of new hires between state and private sectors.  Women are generally less
likely than men to be in new jobs in the transition economies, but the opposite is true in Britain.  Firm
size too is an important determinant of new hires.  Enterprises with more than 100 workers have new
hire rates around 5 points lower than small firms with less than 6 workers.  The latter firms dominate
particularly new hires in the Russian private sector.  There is no evidence that the capital city has any
differential effects on hiring rates in the transition economies.
Tables 10 to 12 present OLS estimates of the weekly wage gap between new jobs and other
jobs for full-time employees in an effort to assess the relative size of wage offers in new jobs.15  The
default tenure category is 1 to 2 years job tenure.  The results suggest that the payoffs associated with
new jobs depend on the sector in which the job is created and the country concerned.16 For Poland
(Table 10), there is little difference between state and private sector wages in new jobs.  The average
new job pays around 5% less than the default category in both sectors.  It may be that re-structuring
firms in Poland have to pay the same wage as the private sector in order to recruit new workers.  The
within sector wage-tenure profiles in Poland are significantly flatter than in Britain and indeed turn down
after ten years.  This may give support to the idea that long-tenure jobs in the privatised sector are
valued only little more than new private sector jobs.  In the state sector, returns rise monotonically with
seniority.  In Russia, there is an absence of any return to job tenure in either the state or the private
sector, other than the fact that the new state sector jobs seem to pay much less than the average (Table
11).  Russian private sector jobs pay around 13% more than jobs in the state sector, net of wage
arrears.17 This premium in itself may help explain the higher Russian turnover rates that we observe in
the previous section.
                                                
15. This excludes most agricultural workers in Poland, but not elsewhere.
16. These results may, of course, be influenced by any heterogeneity in the quality of the job match that
could also generate an upward sloping wage-tenure profile. See Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel
(1991) for ways of dealing with this issue, which cannot be implemented given the limited longitudinal
information in our data sets. 
17. Removal of industry dummies makes little difference to the state level and interaction terms in any
country.
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6. Conclusions
It seems that there is an inverse tenure-turnover profile in both transition countries, which is higher in
Russia than in Poland.  Turnover is higher in the private sector at all tenures than in state sector firms in
both countries.  Turnover in the Russian state sector is much higher and this explains why the aggregate
turnover profile in Russia generally lies above that of Poland (and Britain).  Since most workers with
tenure greater than five years will be in privatised rather than new private sector firms, it appears that
privatised firms are shedding labour faster than state firms.  However less than one fifth of workers
leaving a state sector job are in private sector work one year later.  The pace of new job creation is
higher in the private sector, but the chance of private sector jobs lasting two years are only half that of a
new state sector job.  Whilst we do find that separation rates are larger at any given tenure level in
Russia than in Britain, a Western economy toward the flexible end of the labour market, there is no
evidence to suggest that this holds for Poland.  This seems difficult to square with a simple story of
accelerated depreciation of firm-specific capital acquired before transition.  Insider forces may then be
helping shape worker turnover in Poland more than in Russia.  We find little difference in the
characteristics of those hired in the state and private sectors during transition.  The demands of firms re-
structuring and those involved in the re-allocation of labour appear to be similar.  We do however find
evidence in Russia, that job tenure does little to explain wage levels, whereas the earnings differential
between new and existing jobs in Poland is of a similar magnitude to those observed in the West.  This
may be because the labour market transition process in Poland has been less volatile and smoother than
in Russia, where uncertainty looks set to dominate over the next few years.
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Table 1.  Distribution of Job Tenure, Poland & Russia, 1994,1996
Length of
current job
               Total                 Men              Women
1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996
Poland
<1 year 13.8 (0.2) 14.3 (0.2) 15.1 (0.3) 15.7 (0.2) 12.3 (0.2) 12.5 (0.3)
1-2 years  6.5 (0.2)  8.1  (0.2)  7.0 (0.2)  8.3 (0.2)  6.0 (0.3)  8.0 (0.2)
2-5 years 16.8 (0.1) 15.9 (0.2) 17.7 (0.3) 16.4 (0.3) 15.7 (0.3) 15.3 (0.3)
5-10 years 15.8 (0.2) 17.4 (0.2) 15.3 (0.3) 17.6 (0.3) 16.5 (0.3) 17.1 (0.3)
10-20 years 22.1 (0.3) 20.6 (0.2) 21.4 (0.3) 19.9 (0.3) 23.0 (0.4) 21.4 (0.4)
20 years+ 24.9 (0.3) 23.8 (0.3) 23.6 (0.4) 22.2 (0.3) 26.4 (0.4) 25.8 (0.4)
Russia
<1 year 19.3 (0.6) 19.7 (0.6) 22.8 (0.9) 21.3 (0.9) 16.0 (0.7) 18.2 (0.8)
1-2 years 12.2 (0.5) 11.5 (0.5) 13.5 (0.7) 13.3 (0.8) 10.9 (0.6) 10.0 (0.6)
2-5 years 21.4 (0.6) 22.8 (0.7) 21.3 (0.8) 24.1 (1.0) 21.5 (0.8) 21.5 (0.9)
5-10 years 15.4 (0.5) 15.3 (0.6) 12.7 (0.7) 13.0 (0.8) 18.1 (0.8) 17.4 (0.8)
10-20 years 19.0 (0.6) 17.6 (0.6) 16.6 (0.8) 15.7 (0.8) 21.3 (0.8) 19.4 (0.9)
20 years+ 12.7 (0.5) 13.1 (0.5) 13.2 (0.7) 12.7 (0.7) 12.2 (0.7) 13.5 (0.7)
Britain
<1 year 18.2 (0.2) 16.9 (0.2) 19.6 (0.2)
1-2 years 10.4 (0.1)  9.5 (0.2) 11.5 (0.2)
2-5 years 18.6 (0.2) 17.0 (0.2) 20.6 (0.2)
5-10 years 21.8 (0.2) 20.1 (0.3) 23.9 (0.3)
10-20 years 19.9 (0.2) 21.3 (0.2) 18.4 (0.2)
20 years+ 11.0 (0.1) 15.2 (0.1)  6.0(0.1)
Note:  Sample sizes in 1994 and 1996 are 26909, 27205 for Poland, 4225, 4842 for Russia and
62960 for Britain.  Standard errors in  brackets.
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 Table 2.  Worker Separations and Job-to-Job Moves by Tenure, Age
                Total Separation Rate                 Job-to-Job
Russia Poland Britain Russia Poland Britain
Tenure
<1 year 37.0 (1.4) 38.8 (1.2) 37.4 (0.7) 21.3 (1.2) 16.3 (0.9) 26.5 (0.7)
1-2 years 23.8 (1.5) 19.9 (1.4) 22.1 (0.8) 11.7 (1.1) 10.8 (1.1) 15.8 (0.7)
2-5 years 19.0 (1.0) 14.9 (0.8) 16.1 (0.5)  9.4 (0.8)  6.4 (0.5) 11.8 (0.4)
5-10 years 16.4 (1.1)  9.2 (0.6) 10.6 (0.4)  7.7 (0.8)  3.4 (0.4)  7.1 (0.3)
10-20 years 13.8 (0.9)  6.8 (0.5)  7.8 (0.3)  7.5 (0.7)  2.6 (0.3)  4.5 (0.3)
20 years+ 14.0 (1.1)  9.0 (0.5)  8.2 (0.5)  3.4 (0.6)  1.4 (0.2)  3.1 (0.3)
Total 20.5 (0.5) 14.1 (0.3) 16.1 (0.2) 10.2 (0.4)  5.4 (0.2) 11.0 (0.2)
Age
16-19 48.7 (5.6) 34.5 (2.4) 39.7 (1.7) 15.0 (4.0) 16.4  (1.8) 27.5 (1.6)
20-24 32.4 (2.0) 22.7 (1.2) 28.3 (1.0) 16.9 (1.6) 11.5 (1.0) 22.3 (1.0)
25-29 22.7 (1.5) 14.3 (1.0) 21.0 (0.7) 12.1 (1.2)  6.9 (0.7) 15.8 (0.7)
30-34 23.1 (1.4) 13.7 (0.8) 17.0 (0.6) 13.5 (1.1)  5.9 (0.6) 11.8 (0.5)
35-39 17.9 (1.1) 10.3 (0.6) 13.8 (0.5) 10.3 (0.9)  4.3 (0.4) 10.2 (0.5)
40-44 15.6 (1.1) 10.8 (0.7) 12.4 (0.5)  9.6 (0.9)  5.0 (0.5)  8.6 (0.5)
45-49 16.2 (1.2) 11.2 (0.8) 11.4 (0.5)  9.5 (1.0)  3.2 (0.5)  7.5 (0.4)
50-55 15.7 (1.6) 12.6 (1.1) 12.4 (0.6)  5.4 (1.0)  2.9 (0.6)  7.0 (0.4)
Note:  Standard errors in brackets.  Sample sizes; 12753 Poland, 6665 Russia and 27648 Britain
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Table 3.  Worker Separations by Tenure and Age
                                                  Tenure (years)
Total <1 1-3 3-5 5-7 7-9 9-11 11-15 15-19 19+
Russia
16-29 45.0 22.2 23.9 22.8 12.2 19.2    
30-39 32.2 27.7 21.0 19.0 16.8 16.5 12.2 11.4    
40-49 35.1 22.3 12.7 11.9  8.9  8.4 13.6 12.2 10.1
50+ 33.3 24.8 23.9 25.9 16.7 14.9 17.1 17.2 16.2
Poland
16-29 39.5 22.6 14.6  7.5  7.1 10.3    
30-39 38.7 14.1 12.5  7.0  6.4 10.3 4.2 5.8    
40-49 36.7 15.3 11.2 10.6  9.5  8.5 6.1 5.1  4.8
50+ 42.9 24.5 21.0 17.4 18.4 20.9 12.4 11.1 12.3
Britain
16-29 43.6 29.4 20.8 12.9 13.9 11.5    
30-39 26.2 22.5 13.3 11.6  9.0  6.7 5.0 7.6    
40-49 27.9 16.0 11.5 11.5  8.0  8.5 7.2 7.1  7.5
50+ 29.5 17.8 17.4  7.7 13.3 13.4  9.3 12.2 13.0
Job-to-job
Russia
16-29 25.8 10.6 11.4  9.5  4.1 11.5    
30-39 20.8 15.7 11.5 12.3 10.2  9.6  7.0  7.2    
40-49 20.4 14.8  7.9  8.2  5.0  3.4  8.1  6.3  5.4
50+ 11.1  7.0  5.2  4.7  2.6  2.1  5.7  4.6  2.4
Poland
16-29 19.1 12.1  7.7  2.6  2.7  3.1    
30-39 15.1  8.0  6.0  3.7  3.7  5.4 2.1 2.8    
40-49 14.7  8.0  4.2  2.5  4.7  3.7 2.6 1.6  1.5
50+  9.8  6.5  2.0  3.5  2.3  3.3 3.7 1.6 1.3
Britain
16-29 28.3 19.1 13.9  8.7  6.8  8.6    
30-39 16.1 14.8 10.6  7.1  5.6  6.2 2.1 2.3    
40-49 18.3  9.9  8.4  6.1  4.4  4.3 3.6 3.1  2.6
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50+ 14.5  5.8 10.2  2.8  2.7  3.4 4.2 5.6  3.4
Table 4.  Worker Turnover in State and Private Firms by Tenure, 1994/96
Job Length
                          Total                                      of which   (%)
       Job-to-State                     Job-to-Private               Unemployment                    Inactivity           
Poland Russia Britain Poland Russia Poland Russia Poland
Private
<1 year 40.2 (1.5) 46.1 (2.0) 39.3 (0.8)  7.5 15.4 32.9 33.8 38.7
1-2 years 23.3 (1.8) 28.3 (2.5) 24.5 (0.9)  7.2 14.8 47.4 24.6 24.7
2-5 years 17.5 (1.0) 22.0 (1.8) 17.5 (0.6) 10.1 22.0 31.9 29.0 25.4
5-10 years 11.4 (1.2) 19.7 (2.1) 11.8 (0.5) 13.0 12.2 26.1 26.5 30.4
10-20 years  8.3 (0.9) 14.6 (1.7)  8.5 (0.4)  4.4 26.5 26.1 20.4 17.4
20 years+  8.8 (0.7) 17.6 (2.2)  7.9 (0.6) 16.7 4.8 16.7 11.9 27.8
Total 17.4 (0.5) 26.1 (0.9) 18.0 (0.3) 8.5 16.5 33.6 27.9 32.5
State
<1 year 36.4 (2.0) 28.8 (1.8) 25.6 (1.7) 25.4 25.9 16.9 28.1 39.0
1-2 years 12.2 (2.1) 20.9 (1.9) 12.7 (1.5) 20.0 25.4 23.3 24.0 40.0
2-5 years 10.8 (1.1) 17.4 (1.3) 10.9 (0.9) 18.7 22.3 26.4 15.2 16.5
5-10 years  7.9 (0.8) 15.2 (1.3)  7.3 (0.6) 13.1 19.3 22.2 14.8 22.2
10-20 years  6.1 (0.5) 13.7 (1.1)  6.3 (0.6) 15.5 31.8 18.1 15.3 26.7
20 years+  9.2 (0.8) 12.5 (1.3)  8.8  (0.9)  9.7 8.1  6.7 4.8  9.0
Total 10.9 (0.4) 17.5 (0.6) 10.1 (0.4) 17.7 23.0 17.4 18.3 25.6
Note.  Standard errors in brackets.  Sample sizes 6457 (private) 6296 (state) in Poland; 2577 and 4344
in Russia; 20609 and 6794 Britain
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Table 5.  Probit Estimates of Worker Separation (Marginal Effects)
Poland Poland Russia Russia Britain Britain
Ten. < 1 yr  .310 (.013)*  .258 (.015)*  .232 (.016)*  .170 (.017)*  .294 (.008)*  .255 (.008)*
Ten. 1-2 yr  .125 (.015)*  .098 (.015)*  .100 (.017)*  .068 (.018)*  .142 (.009)*  .117 (.009)*
Ten. 2-5 yr  .072 (.009)*  .061 (.009)*  .051 (.012)*  .029 (.014)*  .081 (.006)*  .065 (.006)*
Ten. 5-10 yr  .013 (.007)  .014 (.008)  .026 (.014)*  .018 (.015)  .027 (.005)*  .020 (.005)*
Age 25-34 -.020 (.006)* -.037 (.015) * -.021 (.005)*
Age 35-44 -.035 (.007)* -.059 (.015) * -.043 (.005)*
Age 45-54 -.008 (.008) -.078 (.015)* -.041 (.005)*
Age 55+  .050 (.012)* -.003 (.018) -.015 (.006)*
Female  .004 (.005) -.002 (.010)   .008 (.004)
University -.020 (.010)* -.039 (.015)* -.004 (.006) 
Technical -.022 (.011)* -.027 (.012)* -.010 (.007)
High School -.023 (.007)*  .012 (.014) -.005 (.005) 
Tech. High -.004 (.011) -.027 (.016) -.002 (.005) 
Tech Train -.012 (.006)* -.035 (.013) *     ----
Capital -.013 (.010)  .018 (.021)  .006 (.006) 
Firm 6-20  .025 (.009)* -.009 (.017)     ----
Firm 21-50   .015 (.009) -.024 (.018)    -----
Firm 51-100 -.001 (.010) -.046 (.016)* -.001 (.005) 
Firm 101 + -.021 (.008)* -.049 (.017)* -.005 (.004)
State  .001 (.007) -.036 (.010)* -.035 (.004)*
Mean D. V. .142 .142 .206 .206 .161 .161
Evaluated at .080 .077 .138 .146 .079 .085
Log L -4659.7 -4467.7 -3245.3 -3107.2 -11230.3 -11050.1
Pseudo R2 .088 .125 .038 .079     .079     .094
N 12479 12479 6639 6639      27605      27605
Note: marginal effects give percentage point deviation from default which is worker with ten years or more tenure
and all other variables set to sample means.  Standard errors in brackets, heteroskedasticity adjusted. Regressions
also contain 1 digit industry, occupation and regional dummies, Default categories are; Tenure 10years+, Age 16-24,
Primary qualifications, Firms size 1-5 employees.
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Table 6.  Probit Estimates of Worker Separation by Ownership (Marginal Effects)
              Poland                  Russia                  Britain
State Private State Private State Private
Ten. < 1 yr  .256 (.023)*  .254 (.025)*  .132 (.022)*  .228 (.028)*  .183 (.022)*  .277 (.009)*
Ten. 1-2 yr  .051 (.022)*  .116 (.022)*  .068 (.023)*  .078 (.030)*  .052 (.018)*  .138 (.010)*
Ten. 2-5 yr  .030 (.012)*  .076 (.015)*  .029 (.017)  .028 (.024)  .036 (.011)*  .077 (.007)
Ten. 5-10 yr  .001 (.009)  .025 (.015)  .012 (.017)  .025 (.027)  .002 (.009)  .029 (.006)
Age 25-34 -.009 (.011) -.031 (.010)* -.030 (.019) -.048 (.025) -.025 (.012)* -.018 (.005)*
Age 35-44 -.030 (.011)* -.047 (.011)* -.048 (.020)* -.072 (.026)* -.048 (.013)* -.038 (.005)*
Age 45-54 -.003(.012) -.018 (.012) -.077 (.018)* -.078 (.026)* -.045 (.013)* -.039 (.006)*
Age 55+  .119 (.028)*  .028 (.016)  .009 (.024) -.020 (.031) -.007 (.015) -.016 (.007)*
Female  .005 (.007)  .011 (.007) -.001 (.013) -.003 (.017)   .006 (.007)  .007 (.004)
University -.029 (.013)* -.023 (.017) -.036 (.019) -.047 (.024) -.012 (.013) -.013 (.007)
Technical -.039 (.015)*  .004 (.025) -.027 (.015) -.028 (.020) -.017 (.013) -.009 (.008)
High School -.028 (.009)* -.028 (.011)*  .018 (.019)  .004 (.023) -.008 (.011) -.003 (.005)
Tech. High -.018 (.013)  .004 (.018) -.013 (.021) -.044 (.025) -.007 (.011) -.001 (.005)
Tech Train -.014 (.009) -.019 (.009)* -.022 (.017) -.054 (.022)*     ----     ----
Capital -.005 (.015) -.020 (.015)  .019 (.028) -.004 (.032)  .007 (.013)  .006 (.007) 
Firm 6-20  .016 (.019)  .010 (.011) -.029 (.021)  .028 (.029)    ----   ----
Firm 21-50   .005 (.017) -.001 (.014) -.023 (.024) -.026 (.031)    ----    ----
Firm 51-100 -.009 (.016) -.009 (.017) -.037 (.021) -.063 (.026)* -.001 (.011)  .001 (.005) 
Firm 101 + -.026 (.016) -.026 (.015) -.039 (.022) -.057 (.028)*  .009 (.009) -.009 (.004)*
Mean D. V. .110 .173 .173 .261 .101 .181
Evaluated at .067 .092 .137 .167 .076 .087
Log L -1816.4 -2600.2 -1789.3 -1290.8 -2082.8 -8906.3
Pseudo R2 .139 .118 .064 .094     .061     .095
N  6077 6402 4159 2481      6785      20817
Note:  see Table 5.
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 Table 7.  Lifetime Job Distribution in Poland, Russia and Britain, 1996
                 Poland                                Russia                            Britain
New Jobs a
Year
New Jobs
Over the
Interval
Cumulative
Number of
Jobs
New Jobs a
Year
New Jobs
Over the
Interval
Cumulative
Number of
Jobs
New Jobs a
Year
Age 16-19 1.10 4.4 4.4 1.132  4.5  4.5 0.805
Age 20-24 .596 3.0 7.4  .604  3.0  7.5 0.396
Age 25-29 .268 1.3 8.7  .252  1.3  8.8 0.273
Age 30-34 .176 0.7 9.4  .228  1.1  9.9 0.199
Age 35-39 .168 0.8 10.2  .240  1.2 11.1 0.178
Age 40-44 .124 0.6 10.8  .160  0.8 11.9 0.139
Age 45-49 .096 0.5 11.3  .208  1.0 12.0 0.120
Age 50-54 .088 0.4 11.7  .136  0.7 12.7 0.107
Age 55-59 .068 0.3 12.0  .120  0.6 13.3 0.103
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Table 8.  Survival Rates of New Matches by State and Private Sector
                          Proportion of Surviving Matches with <12 months tenure in Nov. 94
Feb95 May95 Aug95 Nov95 Feb96 May96 Aug96 Nov96
Poland
State .860 .710 .624 .564 .568 .566 .498 .437
Private .817 .651 .514 .442 .433 .395 .315 .294
Total .847 .697 .583 .522 .517 .498 .424 .387
Russia
State .756 .559
Private .564 .391
Total .622 .482
Britain                          
  
         
State .962 .766 .712 .712 .709 .621 .567 .548
Private .891 .729 .643 .569 .509 .444 .430 .371
Total .900 .734 .653 .589 .536 .466 .449 .396
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Table 9.  Probit Estimates of Likelihood of Being in New Job by Ownership - 1996  (Marginal
effects) 
Britain Poland Russia
State Private State Private State Private
Female  .004 (.006)  .020 (.004)* -.014 (.005)* -.007 (.006) -.034 (.012)* -.038 (.015)*
Age 16-24
Age 25-34 -.105 (.006)* -.147 (.004)* -.095 (.004)* -.114 (.006)* -.115 (.011)* -.149 (.017)*
Age 35-44 -.142 (.006)* -.196 (.004)* -.151 (.006)* -.156 (.006)* -.138 (.012)* -.195 (.018)*
Age 45-54 -.169 (.006)* -.222 (.003)* -.133 (.005)* -.161 (.005)* -.144 (.010)* -.191 (.015)*
Age 55+ -.121 (.003)* -.199 (.003)* -.077 (.003)* -.170 (.005)* -.143(.009)* -.200 (.011)*
Primary/less
University  .014 (.008) -.007 (.006)  .012 (.014) -.039 (.012)*  .012 (.018)  .027 (.025)
Tech. Coll. -.027 (.010)* -.023 (.011)*  .002 (.013) -.043 (.017)* -.010 (.016)  .005 (.022)
High School -.020 (.008)* -.031 (.006)* -.022 (.008)* -.018 (.009)  .061 (.021)*  .026 (.025)
Tech. High  .001 (.008) -.025 (.005)* -.017 (.009) -.001 (.014)  .055 (.026)* -.043 (.028)
Tech. Train  -.029 (.006)* -.007 (.008) -.012 (.018) -.011 (.026) 
Capital  .023 (.010)*  .002 (.007) -.014 (.010) -.027 (.012)*  .034 (.028)  .035 (.032)
Firm 1-5
Firm 6-20 -.003 (.013)  .050 (.009)*  .009 (.027) -.031 (.026)
Firm 21-50   -.009 (.012)  .030 (.011)* -.006 (.028) -.094 (.025)*
Firm 51-100 -.036 (.007)*  .014 (.006)* -.019 (.011)  .018 (.014) -.024 (.025) -.077 (.024)*
Firm 101 + -.055 (.008)* -.042 (.005)* -.059 (.013)* -.048 (.009)* -.049 (.023)* -.124 (.022)*
OtherServs
Agriculture  .084 (.093) -.089 (.010)* -.055 (.023)* -.180 (.014)*  .007 (.026)  .016 (.037) 
Manufactu -.047 (.022)* -.045 (.008)* -.022 (.025) -.036 (.014)  .014 (.024)  .023 (.032) 
Construction -.013 (.016) -.046 (.009)*  .049 (.034) -.055 (.020)*  .036 (.033)  .045 (.043) 
Energy -.059 (.029)* -.066 (.014)*  .063 (.035) -.042 (.028)  .022 (.029)  .013 (.042) 
Transport -.026 (.011)* -.014 (.010) -.009 (.029) -.033 (.017) -.008 (.025)  .037 (.043) 
Retail  .065 (.027)* -.011 (.008)  .098 (.035)* -.015 (.015)  .053 (.037)  .124 (.040)*
Finance -.006 (.013) -.027 (.008)  .001 (.053) -.007 (.021) -.022 (.047)  .212 (.075)*
Health/Educ  .023 (.006)*  .012 (.010) -.023 (.023) -.025 (.031) -.004 (.021) -.012(.041)
Mean D.V.  .115  .203  .089  .184  .147  .208
Log L -4651.2 -20972.0 -3025.7 -5888.3 -1727.3 -1375.7
LR Test (df) 419.8 (29)* 321.0 (31)* 62.6 (31)*
Psuedo R2  .089  .083  .159  .094  .076  .104
N 14275 45358 11972 15025 4483 3000
Note: marginal effects give percentage point deviation from sample mean in presence of relevant variable.  Standard
errors in brackets.  LR Test (df) is likelihood ratio test for private/state sector split.
Russian data is pooled over 1995 and 1996.
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 Table 10.  OLS Estimates of Log Weekly Earnings – Poland 1995/96
Variable     Total     Private     State
Constant  4.548 (.019) *  4.497 (.035) * 4.513 (.028) *
Tenure 1-2 years
Tenure  < 12 mths -.122 (.026) * -.053 (.014) * -.050 (.016) *
Tenure 2-5 years  .032 (.011) *  .021 (.014) *  .052 (.015) *
Tenure 5-10 years  .073 (.011) *  .066 (.017) *  .096 (.015) *
Tenure 10-20 years  .097 (.011) *  .056 (.019) *  .126 (.014) *
Tenure 20+ years  .115 (.012) *  .035 (.022) *  .149 (.015) *
State*Ten.<12mths  .044 (.015) *                -- --
State -.069 (.008) *                -- --
Female -.209 (.006) * -.202 (.010) * -.211 (.007) *
Age 16-24
Age 25-34  .081 (.009) *  .084 (.013) *  .080 (.012) *
Age 35-44  .138 (.009) *  .117 (.013) *  .148 (.012) *
Age 45-54  .154 (.010) *  .141 (.017) *  .163 (.014) *
Age 55+  .164 (.018) *  .039 (.034) *  .200 (.021) *
Primary/less
University  .606 (.011) *  .728 (.030) *  .581 (.012) *
Technical College  .314 (.013) *  .296 (.036) *  .311 (.014) *
High School  .239 (.009) *  .198 (.016) *  .257 (.009) *
Tech. High School  .243 (.012) *  .210 (.023) *  .258 (.014) *
Technical Training  .087 (.008) *  .084 (.014) *  .092 (.009) *
Capital  .149 (.010) * .252 (.025) *  .122(.017) *
N 16294   5529 10765
F Test (n1, n2)
State/private split
8.37(37, 16220)*
Adj. R2  .397 .353  .432
Hetroskedastic adjusted standard errors in brackets.  Regressions also contain 9 regional dummies, 5 firm
size and 8 industry dummies.  F Test is for validity of sample split into state and private.
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Table 11.  OLS Estimates of Log Weekly Earnings – Russia 1995/96
Variable Total Private State
Constant 11.803 (.108) * 12.139 (.158) * 11.332 (.140) **
Tenure 1-2 years
Tenure<12mths -.013 (.061)  -.064 (.075) -.222 (.065) **
Tenure 2-5 years -.083 (.046) -.123 (.073) -.045 (.059)
Tenure 5-10 years -.101 (.049)* -.052 (.083) -.101 (.063)
Tenure 10-20 years -.028 (.048) -.084 (.082)  .024 (.061)
Tenure 20+ years  .053 (.053) -.032 (.088)  .099 (.066)
State*Ten.<12mths -.254 (.067) *         --          --
State -.126 (.031) *         --                --
Female -.433 (.027) * -.445 (.044) * -.407 (.035) *
Age 16-24
Age 25-34  .116 (.051) *  .146 (.084)  .100 (.063) * 
Age 35-44   .181 (.051) *  .158 (.083)  .193 (.063) *
Age 45-54   .163 (.054) *  .182 (.087) *  .162 (.068) *
Age 55+ -.139 (.057) * -.130 (.097)  -.111 (.071)  
Primary/less
University  .365 (.041) *   .313 (.065) *  .413 (.052) *
Technical College  .174 (.038) *  .132 (.061) *  .215 (.047) *
High School -.044 (.045)  -.104 (.071)   .019 (.058)  
Tech. High School -.039 (.049)  -.054 (.078) -.034 (.068)  
Technical Training -.057 (.051)  -.115 (.085) -.043 (.058)  
Capital  .186 (.062) *  .280 (.092) *  .083 (.083)
N 4145 1708 2437
F Test (n1, n2) -
state/private split
3.34 (38,4890)*
Adj. R2  .297 .283  .307
Heteroskedastic adjusted standard errors in brackets.  Regressions also contain 8 regional dummies, 8
industry dummies a year dummy and a control for the presence of wage arrears.
23
Table 12.  OLS Estimates of Log Weekly Earnings – Britain 1996
Variable     Total     Private     State
Constant  4.856 (.043) *  4.722 (.056) * 5.111 (.079) *
Tenure 1-2 years
Tenure<12mths -.085 (.026) * -.098 (.026) *  .031 (.058)
Tenure 2-5 years  .091 (.023) *  .076 (.025) *  .174 (.054) *
Tenure 5-10 years  .128 (.021) *  .106 (.024) *  .234 (.052) *
Tenure 10-20 years  .164 (.023) *  .128 (.026) *  .296 (.052) *
Tenure 20+ years  .253 (.026) *  .190 (.029) *  .452 (.056) *
State*Ten.<12mths  .046 (.041)           --           --
State  .028 (.021) *           --          --  
Female -.264 (.013) * -.297 (.016) * -.174 (.023) *
Age 16-24
Age 25-34  .413 (.021) *  .435 (.023) *  .243 (.047) *
Age 35-44  .502 (.022) *  .522 (.025) *  .329 (.049) *
Age 45-54  .468 (.024) *  .503 (.026) *  .269 (.052) *
Age 55+  .362 (.029) *  .383 (.032) *  .163 (.064) *
Primary/less
University  .492 (.018) *  .492 (.022) *  .459 (.031) *
Technical College  .343 (.025) *  .389 (.045) *  .235 (.053) *
High School  .263 (.018) *  .270 (.022) *  .206 (.033) *
Tech. High School  .107 (.016) *  .118 (.017) *  .042 (.032)
Capital  .219 (.021) ** .240 (.027) **  .179(.032) *
N 5851  4290 1561
F Test (n1, n2)
state/private split
3.66 (35, 5781)*
Adj. R2  .421 .442  .341
Hetroskedastic adjusted standard errors in brackets.  Regressions also contain 9 regional dummies, 5 firm
size and 8 industry dummies.
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 Table A1.  Share of Moves Across Ownership Types by Tenure, 1994/96
Job Length
                          Total                                      of which   (%)
      Job-to-State                     Job-to-Private               Unemployment                    Inactivity           
Poland Russia Britain Poland Russia Poland Russia
Private
<1 year 52.7 40.0 38.7 46.5 37.4 51.5 48.6
1-2 years 14.2 12.2 15.4 12.1 10.8 20.1 10.7
2-5 years 20.3 19.9 16.9 24.1 26.5 19.2 20.7
5-10 years  6.8 9.8 14.6 10.3 7.2  5.2 9.3
10-20 years  3.4 9.8  9.0 1.7 15.7  2.6 7.1
20 years+  2.6 8.4  5.1 5.2 2.4  1.3 3.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
State
<1 year 31.2 25.0 27.2 44.6 28.1 30.2 38.2
1-2 years 4.4 12.8 11.5  5.0 14.1  5.9 16.7
2-5 years 13.3 20.1 17.5 14.1 19.5 20.2 16.7
5-10 years 14.5 15.8 15.7 10.7 13.3 18.5 12.8
10-20 years 17.0 15.3 15.0 14.9 21.1 17.7 12.8
20 years+ 19.6 11.1 13.1 10.7 3.9  7.6 2.9
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Table A2.  Share of New Hires  Across Ownership Types  1994/96
Origin State
                                                         
 Share in Total                   Share in State                  Share in Private                
          
Poland Russia Poland Russia Poland Russia
Job – State 14.2 35.9 22.9 36.4  9.8 35.2
Job – Private 26.3 18.7 18.7 18.7 28.7 18.6
Unemp< 12 m 15.0  0.9 13.7  0.6 19.0  1.3
Unemp >12 14.9  1.6 14.9  1.5 16.2 1.7
Unemp New
Entrant/
Missing
 9.6  3.5  7.4  3.7 11.3  3.3
Inactive <12m 3.4  1.8  3.2  1.6  2.6 2.1
Inactive >12m 7.2 11.4  9.7  9.2  4.7 13.8
Inactive New
Entrant /Missing
 9.4 26.2  9.5 28.2  7.7 24.1
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Table A3.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Worker Separation (Marginal Effects)
              Poland                  Russia                  Britain
Job-to-Job Non-Emp. Job-to-Job Non-Emp. Job-to-Job Non-Emp.
Age 25-34 -.007 (.003) -.006 (.005) -.006 (.009) -.029 (.010)* -.010 (.003)* -.006 (.003)*
Age 35-44 -.012 (.003)* -.017 (.005)* -.015 (.010) -.042 (.011)* -.019 (.003)* -.016 (.004)*
Age 45-54 -.015 (.004)*  .013 (.006)* -.028 (.011)* -.050 (.012)* -.024 (.003)* -.007 (.003)*
Age 55+ -.027 (.006)*  .055 (.006)* -.052 (.014)*  .028 (.010)* -.034 (.005)*  .022 (.004)*
State -.003 (.003)  .005 (.005) -.012 (.006)* -.020 (.006)* -.023 (.003)* -.010 (.003)*
Ten. < 1 yr  .040 (.002)*  .077 (.004)*  .070 (.005)*  .042 (.007)*  .079 (.002)*  .043 (.002)*
Ten. 1-2  y  .028 (.003)*  .027 (.006)*  .029 (.008)*  .024 (.009)*  .052 (.002)*  .019 (.003)*
Ten. 2-5 yr  .018 (.002)*  .024 (.004)*  .017 (.007)*  .008 (.008)  .040 (.002)*  .003 (.003) 
Ten. 5-10 y  .005 (.003)  .007 (.005)  .009 (.009)  .008 (.009)  .020 (.002)* -.003 (.003) 
Mean D. V. .061 .099 .105 .102 .108 .053
Evaluated at .020 .060 .058 .081 .040 .040
Log L -5498.6 -3938.8 -13611.9
Pseudo R2 .126 .088     .093    
LR Test 288.9 (41) * 228.6 (42) * 489.7 (40)*
N 12479 6640          27605     
Note: marginal effects give percentage point deviation from default tenure category (ten years and over) with all
other variables set to sample means.  Standard errors in brackets, heteroskedasticity adjusted.  Regressions also
contain education, gender, firm size and 1 digit industry, occupation and regional dummies.  LR Test is Chi2
likelihood ratio test (degrees of freedom) for sample split of movers into job-to-job and non-employment (coefficients
equal).
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Table A4.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Move From Private Firms (Marginal Effects)
Variable Poland Russia Britain
Job-to-Job Non-Emp Job-to-Job Non-Emp Job-to-Job Non-Emp
Age 25-34 -.018 (.007)* -.008 (.006)  -.016 (.015 ) -.027 (.017) -.008 (.002)* -.006 (.003)
Age 35-44 -.026 (.009)* -.014 (.006)* -.026 (.016 ) -.040 (.018)* -.018  (.003)* -.015  (.003)*
Age 45-54 -.030 (.011)*  .009 (.006)  -.025 (.018 ) -.053 (.021)* -.024  (.004)* -.007  (.004)
Age 55+ -.060 (.018)*  .040 (.010)* -.052 (.023 )*  .021 (.019)  -.036  (.005)*  .022  (.004)*
Ten < 1 y  .059 (.010)*  .063 (.011)*  .094 (.009 )*  .058 (.011)*  .088 (.003)*  .044 (.002)*
Ten 1-2 y  .046 (.009)*  .025 (.007)*  .033 (.014 )*  .031 (.014)*  .059  (.003)*  .021 (.003)*
Ten 2-5 y  .025 (.007)*  .026 (.007)*  .028 (.012 )*  .001 (.015)  .044  (.002)*  .006 (.003)
Ten 5-10 y  .005 (.009)   .014 (.007)*  .021 (.015 )  .005  (.017)  .023  (.003)*  .001 (.004)
Mean D.V.     .122     .168          .134 .131 .124 .056
Evaluated at .022 .064 .071 .074 .040 .038
Log L -3238.1 -1683.56 -11046.2
LR Test 213.8 (40)* 100.9 (41)* 384.2 (39) *
Pseudo R2 .123 .099 .093
N 6402 2473 20817
Table A5.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Likelihood of Move From State Firms (Marginal
Effects)
Variable Poland Russia Britain
Job-to-Job Non-Emp Job-to-Job Non-Emp Job-to-Job Non-Emp
Age 25-34 -.004 (.004) -.004 (.008)  .001 (.013 ) -.029 (.013 )* -.017 (.006) *  .012 (.012 )
Age 35-44 -.008 (.004) * -.019 (.008) * -.006 (.013 )* -.038 (.014 )* -.026 (.008 )* -.003 (.012 )
Age 45-54 -.012 (.005) *  .010 (.008) -.031 (.015 )* -.044 (.015 )* -.031 (.009 )*  .009 (.012 )
Age 55+ -.009 (.008)   .068 (.010) * -.054 (.018 )*  .032 (.012 )* -.029 (.011 )*  .038 (.012 )*
Ten < 1 yr  .036 (.003) *  .069 (.005) *  .058 (.007 )*  .031 (.009 )*  .056 (.010 )*  .030 (.006 )*
Ten 1-2 ys  .016 (.005) *  .016 (.011)   .031 (.010 )*  .019 (.010 )  .026 (.007 )*  .008 (.009 )
Ten 2-5 ys  .014 (.003) *  .006 (.008)   .011 (.010 )  .013 (.009 )  .027 (.006 )* -.009 (.007 )
Ten 5-10 y  .004 (.004)  -.004 (.007) -.001 (.011 )  .013 (.010 )  .011 (.005 )* -.011 (.006 )
             
Mean D.V.     .038     .072 .083 .092 .059 .042
Evaluated at .018 .056 .059 .074 .043 .036
Log L -2188.9 -2179.2 -2491.7
LR Test 111.8 (40) 184.1 (41)* 113.1
Pseudo R2 .139  .087 .071
N 6077 4135 6785
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Figure 1.  Annual Separation Rates by Tenure, Britain, Poland, Russia, 1995/96
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Figure 2.  Separation Rates by Ownership
a) Separations: state b) Separations : private
c) Job-to-Job: state d) Job-to-Job: private
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